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Open Access Article

1 - A Response to an Old Problem about Mulla Sadra’s Encounter with Suhrawardi’s Arguments on Denying the Pre-Existence of the Soul
Ali Shirvani Mojtaba Afsharpour

There are some disagreements among philosophers on the pre-existence of the soul, that is, the existence of the soul before joining the body, whether it is originated or pre-eternal. Mulla Sadra maintains that the soul – the soul qua soul – originates in the trans-subst More

There are some disagreements among philosophers on the pre-existence of the soul, that is, the existence of the soul before joining the body, whether it is originated or pre-eternal. Mulla Sadra maintains that the soul – the soul qua soul – originates in the trans-substantial motion of the body (corporeal origination) through particular individuation. However, he agrees with its pre-existence and considers it to be a rational one. When discussing this issue, he investigates, criticizes, and rejects Suhrawardi’s arguments on denying pre-existence. The commentators of Mulla Sadra’s words have always asked the question of why he did not agree with Suhrawardi’s arguments on denying the soul’s pre-existence based on his own particular individuation so that they would appear unanimous with respect to this problem. At least, this is what one could understand from Suhrawardi’s words and arguments. Accordingly, some of the early and contemporary commentators criticized him and believed that his objections to Suhrawardi’s words were unfounded. In this paper, while briefly referring to the fundamental principles of Suhrawardi’s arguments and Mulla Sadra’s related criticisms, the writers explain the main reason why Mulla Sadra refused to accept Suhrawardi’s view about the pre-existence of the soul. Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

2 - Mulla Sadra’s View of Time in the Hereafter
Hadi Jafary Furugh al-Sadat Rahimpoor

The attention to the specific features of the Hereafter, such as time, and its comparison with worldly conditions can be witnessed in many of Mulla Sadra’s works. Given the presupposition that corporeal resurrection and the existence of other-worldly body are necessary More

The attention to the specific features of the Hereafter, such as time, and its comparison with worldly conditions can be witnessed in many of Mulla Sadra’s works. Given the presupposition that corporeal resurrection and the existence of other-worldly body are necessary in the Transcendent Philosophy, the question is whether time also exists in the Hereafter. If the answer is yes, what are its qualities and quantities, and how does it differ from worldly time? The present paper is intended to provide some responses to such questions about time and concludes that the existence of a kind of time which matches the Hereafter and the other-worldly corporeal existence is necessary for believing in corporeal resurrection. This kind of time enjoys a more perfect and intensive level of the worldly existence of time and possesses some other-worldly features such as the relativity of feeling the passage of time, influence of the extent and level of individual’s immateriality in the slowness or speed of the passage of time during other-worldly events, and correspondence of the perception of passage of time with the domination of angelic aspect over each individual (in the course of worldly life). Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

3 - A Critical Study of Functionalism with a Glance at Mulla Sadra’s Self-Knowledge
Reza Safari Kandsari

The relationship between the body and the soul is one of the complex issues in philosophy. The Cartesian and Platonic dualism is one of the solutions offered for this problem. Descartes and Plato believed that the soul and body are two different substances and enjoy the More

The relationship between the body and the soul is one of the complex issues in philosophy. The Cartesian and Platonic dualism is one of the solutions offered for this problem. Descartes and Plato believed that the soul and body are two different substances and enjoy their own particular domains and features. Contemporary philosophers of the mind have also introduced a number of views in order to resolve the problems of substantial dualism. The theories of behaviorism and the identity of the mind and body deny the substantive nature of the soul and employ the words “mind” and “mental states” instead of the word “soul” and maintain that mental states are the same behavioral and brain-related states. However, while acknowledging the problems of dualism, the behavioral approaches, and the standpoint of the identity of the mind and brain, the advocates of functionalism provide an impartial interpretation of the mind (its being abstract or concrete) and believe that mental states are the same functional states which perform certain functional roles based on mental input and output and other mental states. Islamic philosophers and mutikallimun have also tackled the enigma of the soul and body and Plato’s substantial dualism. Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi deny the priority of the soul to the body (Platonic theory) but consider the essence of the soul and body to be immaterial and corporeal, respectively. Most mutikallimun reject the idea of the soul as an immaterial and self-subsistent substance and view it as a delicate kind of body. In line with functionalists, Mulla Sadra was well aware of the problems associated with considering the soul as an immaterial or corporeal substance and argued that the essence of the soul is not purely immaterial or material; rather, it is initially corporeal and then becomes immaterial through trans-substantial motion. He also stated that, based on the shadowy true unity, the soul is an intermediate world inclusive of both materiality and immateriality and becomes material and immaterial based on the states of its grades. Although both functionalists and Mulla Sadra reject the mind’s (the soul in Mulla Sadra’s view) being purely immaterial or corporeal, Mulla Sadra provided a more accurate explanation of the body-soul relation in comparison to functionalists, who hold a physicalist view of the mind. This is because he does not limit being exclusively to nature. Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

4 - A Critical Study of the Differences Between Elemental and Ideal Bodies in Mullā Ṣadrā
Hosain Karimi

20.1001.1.15600874.1400.27.1.1.7

One of the classifications of the reality of the body in philosophical sources and works divides it into Ideal and elemental types. There is no conflict among contemporary philosophers regarding the essence of this division itself; however, they have referred to some di More

One of the classifications of the reality of the body in philosophical sources and works divides it into Ideal and elemental types. There is no conflict among contemporary philosophers regarding the essence of this division itself; however, they have referred to some differences between elemental and Ideal bodies, some of which are based on the principles related to the discussion of material and immaterial entities. Philosophers have provided different definitions for the material and immaterial. One of the important problems in the discussion of the differences between elemental and Ideal bodies is the problem of the existence of potency. Nevertheless, some other differences between them have been mentioned that cannot be completely based on the discussion of material and immaterial entities. Mullā Ṣadrā has extensively dealt with this philosophical problem in his works and referred to 15 differences between these two realities. The study of these differences can provide a better understanding of the reality of elemental and Ideal bodies. The present study indicates that some of these differences are correct; some are incorrect, and some others demand further explanation. Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

5 - Ontological Functions of the Corporeal Dimension of Man in Mullā Ṣadrā’s View
Hadi Jafary Ali Arshad Riahi

20.1001.1.15600874.1401.27.3.1.5

Man’s corporeal dimension is of great significance from various angles in Mullā Ṣadrā’s anthropology. In this paper, the authors deal with one of its important dimensions, that is, its ontological functions. Mullā Ṣadrā has not allocated any independent section to the f More

Man’s corporeal dimension is of great significance from various angles in Mullā Ṣadrā’s anthropology. In this paper, the authors deal with one of its important dimensions, that is, its ontological functions. Mullā Ṣadrā has not allocated any independent section to the functions of Man’s corporeal dimension in his works and has not even directly referred to it. However, these functions can be inferred from his views. A study of his works indicate that Man’s corporeal dimension performs some important functions from an ontological perspective. In this regard reference can be made to the following functions: developing belief, promotion and evolution of Man, having free will, performing opposite acts, completing mental and rational acts, constructing and improving the world, realizing the noblest order, granting identity to the soul, and developing the identity of the perfect Man and some apparently contradictory roles such as becoming the source of evil and the source of freedom from evil. This study, which has been conducted following the library and content analysis methods, in addition to demonstrating the significance and necessity of Man’s corporeal dimension in the world of creation, illustrates that the functions of this dimension have various aspects from an ontological viewpoint and pertain to a number of important realms in the world of being. Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

6 - A Comparison of the Body-Soul Relationship in Philosophical Behaviorism and Sadrian Philosophy
Naeimeh Najmi Nejad Morteza Rezaee

20.1001.1.15600874.1400.27.2.6.4

The discussion of the relationship between the soul and body has always been a challenging problem. The most important problem with this discussion is the quality of the relationship between the soul as an immaterial existence with the body as a material existence. Many More

The discussion of the relationship between the soul and body has always been a challenging problem. The most important problem with this discussion is the quality of the relationship between the soul as an immaterial existence with the body as a material existence. Many thinkers have presented some theories in response to this problem. Following a descriptive-analytic approach, the present study examines and compares behaviorism, which provides some of the important theories in the philosophy of the mind, with the view of Mullā Ṣadrā as the most prominent Islamic Philosopher. The findings of the study indicate that both behaviorist and Mullā Ṣadrā believe in the oneness of the soul and body. However, behaviorists conceive of the soul and mental states as nothing but external human behavior. This approach in fact rejects the immateriality of the soul and its mental states, while Mullā Ṣadrā considers the relationship between the body and the soul as integration through unification based on some of his own principles including the graded trans-substantial motion and the soul’s corporeal origination. In his view, the soul, while being a single substance, enjoys both a material and corporeal level and different levels of immateriality – including Ideal and rational types – because of its graded nature. In other words, there is a single conjunctive truth that appears in the form of the body at lower levels and as the soul at higher levels. Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

7 - A Critical Study of Ibn Sīnā’s Arguments on the Materialism of Particular Perceptive Experience with an Emphasis on the Problem of “Explanatory Gap”
Ahmad Va’ezi Mehdi Karimi

20.1001.1.15600874.1400.27.2.7.5

By doubting the materiality of perceptions based on the problem of explanatory gap, a rational basis is provided for criticizing Ibn Sīnā’s arguments regarding the impossibility of the immateriality of particular perceptions, the demonstration of possibility, and also t More

By doubting the materiality of perceptions based on the problem of explanatory gap, a rational basis is provided for criticizing Ibn Sīnā’s arguments regarding the impossibility of the immateriality of particular perceptions, the demonstration of possibility, and also the necessity of the immateriality of different types of perception. The material interpretation of particular perceptions – whether sensory or imaginal – is among Ibn Sīnā’s views in the ontology of perception. Through providing some arguments on the impossibility of the immateriality of particular perceptive experiences, he believes that the only possible state with respect to such experiences is their immateriality. On the other hand, hypothesizing the existence of a possible world in which a metaphysical state such as pain can be imagined in the absence of a neural process makes the distinction between mental state and neural process possible. This explanatory gap between them makes the immateriality of perception possible through negating the identity of these two phenomena. Given the distinction between physical and metaphysical states and the necessity of the immateriality of perception based on various philosophical arguments, the materiality of particular perception is debatable. Therefore, Mullā Ṣadrā’s idea of the immateriality of sensory and imaginal perception, similar to rational perceptions, presents a more comprehensive explanation of perception and the soul. This paper focus on a study of the whatness and ontology of particular perceptions, the discussion of which is subcategorized under the problem of the soul-body relation in the process of perception. Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

8 - Demonstration of Change in Metaphysical Worlds Based on Two Different Foundations
Seyedeh Zahra Mousavi Baygi Seyyed Morteza Hosseini Shahrudi Abbas Javareshkiyan

20.1001.1.15600874.1401.28.1.3.6

Several problems have been produced in the process of philosophy’s interaction with religious theorems. One of the new discussions that has attracted great attention during the last decades pertains to purgatorial and otherworldly perfection of the souls. On the one han More

Several problems have been produced in the process of philosophy’s interaction with religious theorems. One of the new discussions that has attracted great attention during the last decades pertains to purgatorial and otherworldly perfection of the souls. On the one hand, based on the principles and explicit theories of most philosophers and Mullā Ṣadrā’s words, the perfection of the soul after its separation from the elemental body is impossible. On the other hand, some sentences in Qur’anic verses and Islamic traditions refer to the perfection of the soul in metaphysical worlds. Such differences have persuaded researchers and thinkers to find some solutions. Following an analytic-inferential method, this paper seeks to provide an answer to the question of whether the soul is subject to any change and motion after its separation from the body based on both common philosophical principles and Mullā Ṣadrā’s gnostic approach. The findings of this study indicate that, based on philosophers’ principles, changes in the states of souls after death is an acceptable view of the type of sequence of forms and manifestation of developed habits and forms in the world of nature. Moreover, according to a gnostic reading of the Transcendent Philosophy, changes in metaphysical worlds are certain and of the same type of change in the material world. However, in this approach change and motion are not used in their common philosophical senses and are, rather, used in the sense of departure from undifferentiation to differentiation and manifestation. In this way, the authors provide a rational explanation of change and motion in this paper relying on philosophical principles and through presenting a new definition of motion. Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

9 - Trans-Substantial Motion of the Soul and its Consequences in the Sadrian Study of the Soul
Rouhollah Souri Hamed Komijani

20.1001.1.15600874.1401.28.1.5.8

The soul goes through elemental, natural, mineral, vegetative, animal (Ideal immateriality), and rational (intellectual immateriality) stages in the cradle of its fluid existence. Therefore, the soul’s belonging to the body is a part of its identity and, thus, it can be More

The soul goes through elemental, natural, mineral, vegetative, animal (Ideal immateriality), and rational (intellectual immateriality) stages in the cradle of its fluid existence. Therefore, the soul’s belonging to the body is a part of its identity and, thus, it can be said that the soul is a material-immaterial substance. Given the existential fluidity of the soul, Mullā Ṣadrā has reinterpreted its various characteristics. Accordingly, the soul’s faculties are levels of its continuous truth that flourish one after each other. Moreover, natural death is the result of the soul’s ontological gradedness and losing interest in elemental body. At some stages of this ontological becoming, the soul attains immateriality and, hence, its survival after death become necessary. Because gradedness and, as a result, attaining immateriality are essential to the soul, its incarnation and return to elemental body is unjustifiable. Therefore, after death, the soul begins its purgatorial life in an Ideal body that is created based on its moral habits, and the natural form that is created in the matter of elemental body opens the path towards purgatorial perfection before it. One of the most important consequences of the soul’s trans-substantial motion is its entrance into divine worlds and annihilation in active, attributive, and essential oneness. Interestingly enough, based on the trans-substantial motion, this significant achievement is possible at the moment of the soul’s belonging to elemental body and is not necessarily limited to the moment of occurrence of natural death. Manuscript profile

Open Access Article

10 - An Analysis of the Ascension of the Holy Prophet (ṣ) of Islam Based on the Philosophical Principles of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā
Maryam Samadieh Abdulrazzaq Hessamifar

20.1001.1.15600874.1402.28.3.6.7

In the view of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā, the Prophet’s ascension was an indisputable truth, and those who deny it are among unbelievers and deviators from the right path. Ibn Sīnā believes that the Prophet’s ascension was not corporeal because the body cannot traverse a More

In the view of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā, the Prophet’s ascension was an indisputable truth, and those who deny it are among unbelievers and deviators from the right path. Ibn Sīnā believes that the Prophet’s ascension was not corporeal because the body cannot traverse a very long distance in a moment. Thus, it was intellectual and spiritual. In other words, as the route of the Prophet’s ascension passed through immaterial worlds, one cannot consider this journey a corporeal one. However, Mullā Ṣadrā explicitly speaks of the corporeal quality of the Prophet’s presence in ascension. He believes in the corporeal presence of the Prophet (ṣ) in his heavenly journey as well as the corporeal nature of what happened to him in the night of ascension. Nevertheless, their corporeality is in proportion to the worlds in which the Prophet (ṣ) travelled. Mullā Ṣadrā considers three types of body for human beings: rational, Ideal, and elemental. He maintains that earthly journey is of the elemental type, and heavenly journey is of the Ideal and rational types. He also believes that the Prophet (ṣ) wore the corporeal attire in conformity with the worlds to and through which he travelled. This paper investigates and analyzes the quality of the Prophet’s presence in the night of ascension and the otherworldly things that happened to him during that night following a descriptive-analytic approach and based on the views of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā. Manuscript profile

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